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Accidental Privacy
Spills
By James Grimmelmann

T

he realm of privacy law has more crimes than criminals,
more wrongs than wrongdoers. Some invasions of privacy are neither intentional nor negligent; it’s easy to recognize the harm, but hard to pin the blame. This article
is the story of one such inevitable accident: an “accident”
in that it needn’t have happened, but “inevitable” in that
there’s no principled way to prevent similar misunderstandings from recurring, again and again and again.
L AU R I E G A R R E T T ’ S E M A I L
Laurie Garrett is a science journalist and Pulitzerprize winner best known for her book The Coming Plague.1
In January 2003, while working as a medical and science
writer for Newsday, she attended the World Economic
Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. This annual event,
a gathering of world leaders, major CEOs, and enough
influential intellectuals to liven the discussion a bit, is
roughly to international affairs what Cannes is to filmmaking: a heady mix of high-level networking, celebrityspotting, and an official program of Important Events. In
1994, John Perry Barlow unleashed his Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace at the WEF; more recently, it’s
been the target of strident anti-globalization protests.
Garrett was at the WEF on business, filing dispatches
on speeches by Bill Gates and Colin Powell,2 but she was
also making some rather more personal observations. At
the end of a week of “unfettered, class A hobnobbing,”
she sat down to write about the experience to a “handful”
of friends. She composed a chatty 2,000-word email about
the issues on the minds of the world’s self-proclaimed
movers and shakers. The email was basically a list of perpetual post-millennial hot topics—terrorism and trade,
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American unilateralism versus anti-Americanism, the
leaders (China) and laggards (the US) in global economic
growth—bookended by some brief scene-setting and personal observations.
Her tone could hardly be called “intimate,” but it’s not
exactly polished reporting, either. From the opening, “Hi,
Guys” to the closing “Ciao, Laurie,” the email is a light,
informal letter. She calls Vicente Fox “sexy”; mentions
the “very cool” wireless infrastructure; and describes the
prevailing geopolitical sentiments among major Islamic
leaders. Scientists will recognize the email as a straightforward conference report to one’s close colleagues. This
is where I went; this is who was there and what I saw; this
is what I think of it all.
The WEF was held in the last week of January. In the
next week, the email apparently circulated among a growing set of Garrett’s friends and their friends. By February
6th, a copy of the email, by then forwarded several times,
stripped of its original headers, and minus her last name,
had made its way onto the “PH” mailing list run by the
Institute for Psychohistory. And there it crossed into
the bloodstream, because the PH list is archived on the
Web.3
We all know what happens once something is on
the Web. On February 11th, the Psychohistory archive
version of the email was linked from MetaFilter,4 a “community weblog” whose members both post interesting
links to the front page and post wide-ranging comments
on each others’ links.5 MetaFilter is moderated, but with a
light touch, and because of its strong sense of community
and conversation, the site was and is moderately influential with other bloggers, be they politically, culturally, or
technically inclined.
The initial discussion in the thread on MetaFilter
centered on the question of the email’s authenticity. It
wasn’t hard to determine that “Laurie” was Laurie Garrett,
but to some MetaFilter readers, the story had all the trappings of an obvious hoax. (Indeed, its initial caption was
“Could this be true?”). After all, there wasn’t a byline or
a citation to a verifiable news outlet. Nor, for that matter, was the language especially polished. The second
commenter, “damn yankee,” thought it unlikely that a
professional journalist would write “various insundry” for
“various and sundry.”6 On this view, the email was just the
ramblings of a “breathless teenager” with a real journalist’s
name attached in order to make it plausible as an actual
account.7 The close textual readings of the fraud-detection discussion rapidly spiraled off into a discussion of
economic theory.
Meanwhile, some MeFi regulars decided to go check
for themselves on the email’s authenticity. (MeFi tends to
have an investigative spirit; the community had a major
3
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role in exposing the Kaycee Nicole hoax in 20018 and
an astroturfing campaign by the director of Givewell in
2008.9) Adam Davis, who was listed as having forwarded
the email to the Psychohistory list, confirmed that he had
done so, but couldn’t vouch for the authenticity of the
email that had arrived in his inbox.10
And then, as the economics discussion meandered
along, Garrett herself, on February 14, confirmed her
attendance at Davos. In an email to MetaFilter user beagle
(who had started out his inquiries trying to prove the story
a fake), Garrett stated that she hadn’t actually read the
email supposedly written by her. Instead:
I cannot imagine that any of the close personal
friends to whom I sent a letter from Davos would
visciously pas it on in such a manner.
Yes, I went to Davos.
No, I never wrote a note intended for public consumption.
As I trust my friends, I must asum [sic], without
going to these web sites, that it is a hoax. I would
rather not learn that my friends are scoundrels who
forward very personal mail to the entire world.11
And so things sat for another three days, until Garrett
broke her vow. She clicked on the URL beagle sent her,
and yes, the email she saw there was genuine. Somehow,
this “very personal mail” to her “close personal friends,”
not meant “for public consumption,” had been forwarded
“to the entire world.” So she sat down and wrote beagle
another email, which beagle promptly turned around and
posted back to the MetaFilter thread.12 Matt Haughey,
MetaFilter’s creator and benevolent dictator, added a
front-page link to this exciting news. And here’s where
things get interesting.
M E TA F I LT E R F I G H T S B AC K
Laurie Garrett wasn’t happy to have her email shared
with the world. She was even less happy that the “Internet
addicts of the world” had wasted such extensive time and
effort on such an “extraordinarily silly exercise.” Her message to them ends with a peroration to “Be a citizen of the
real world” and explicitly invokes the image of William
Shatner telling a convention of Star Trek fans to get a
life.
She didn’t get much sympathy. Perhaps bristling
against her insult to their community (“liberal elitist
disingenuinity,” in the words of one), various MeFi-ites
fired back—on MetaFilter, that is—with some harsh statements about dumb journalists who write emails they don’t
intend for public consumption. Thus:
4
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Laurie Garrett needs to learn that you never write
something you don’t stand behind. And if you
don’t stand behind it, it was probably satire. Always
make sure they know when you’re serious and when
you’re not. Give them hints, here and there that
you’re toying with them. Berfore you fire off so haphazardly your one in a billion encounters with the
most wealthy and powerful people on the planet.
—crasspastor13
Maintaining a free society requires an informed
populace. Information is available in more places
than ever before, including on the Internet. To be
honest, I would worry about a democracy that did
not encourage the dissemination of information
using the Internet as a medium.
—jessamyn14
Let’s spell this out for Ms Garrett in big fucking
capital letters shall we? If your mate forwarded on a
letter that you had failed to mark as privileged, readonly or with a similar disclaimer, then you’ve only
got yourself and your friend to blame. The mail we
discussed didn’t have ‘please don’t forward on’ written on it anywhere as far as I can see. Is your friend
telepathic or are you making assumptions about
your friends’ attitude towards your privacy. Or, are
your ‘friends’ of such quality that they’d strip such a
line out of one of your emails prior to stitching you
up like this?
—dmt15
But not being privy to your motivations, how are we
to know why this was posted on the net? Perhaps
it was posted without your permission. Perhaps
you wanted it to be there, and “leaked” it. Ok, we
know now that you didn’t, but don’t blame us for
that lack of prescience, or for the fact that it made
a fascinating read. Personally, I’m not sorry I read
your email, but I’m sorry it was posted without
your knowledge, and that some people said careless
things about you. If you’re looking for somewhere
to shove the “blame” though, you may want to start
closer to home.
—walrus16
The funny thing is that Garrett didn’t really disagree
with any of these analyses. She herself gave a quick
account of the email’s (presumed) spread and gradual
transition from public to private and treated this spread
as inevitable. She drew a contrast with a longhand letter she wrote after attending the 1979 Carter-Brezhnev
talks; casual forwarding would never have landed that
letter before the eyes of thousands. But with email, she
concluded, things were very different:
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This saddens me deeply, and I have learned a sorry
lesson. I shall no longer deliver such personal musings to friends and confidantes via the Internet.
No one can be trusted in this CLICK-FORWARD
electronic world.
And that’s a fairly stunning result, isn’t it? People,
serious and thoughtful people, will stop using email for
certain matters if this is what happens when they use it.
What is more, this sort of letter—a fact-filled but informal update on interesting international issues as seen
from the inside—is a paradigmatic example of what email
is supposed to be for. And, after all, that instantaneous
CLICK-FORWARD loop is one of the great virtues of
email and digital text. When Laurie Garrett’s experience
with “this CLICK-FORWARD electronic world” leads her
to threaten to chuck it all out the window and go back to
longhand, it’s hard not to feel that something has been
lost.
I N F O R M AT I O N WA N T S TO B E F R E E ?
It’s easy to recognize a classically techno-libertarian
viewpoint in some of the responses above. On this view:
•
•
•

It is impossible to stop the spread of information that
has hit the Net.
Further, information that people consider interesting
will spread rapidly.
This spread is a good thing.

It can be hard to argue with these premises. Indeed,
the rapid distribution of Garrett’s original letter seems
like a perfect example of techno-libertarianism working
perfectly. A writer with good inside access dashes off an
essay, which spreads rapidly and comes to the attention of
thoughtful readers who carry on an interesting discussion
about the economic issues that the essay raises. It’s easy
to feel perfectly comfortable siding with the MeFi-ites
against Garrett’s slurs to their community. She may be
upset at their flippant tone, but there’s serious and constructive dialogue taking place in that thread. This is what
democracy looks like, as they say at protests.
That said, it’s also easy to sympathize with Garrett’s
sense of dislocation and betrayal in seeing her “personal”
thoughts spread across the Web. Many MeFi-ites did
express their concern for her sake. walrus said it best:
“Personally, I’m not sorry I read your email, but I’m sorry
it was posted without your knowledge, and that some
people said careless things about you.”17 That’s about as
close as you can get to a pure statement of the paradox:
An essay that brought pleasure and enlightenment to
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many has become—precisely because it was of interest to
so many—such an albatross for its author that she regrets
having written it.
Which is why walrus’s next statement—If you’re looking for somewhere to shove the “blame” though, you may
want to start closer to home.”—is so disturbing.18 Since
wide distribution is so inevitable in the techno-libertarian
scheme of things, authors who don’t want wide distribution have only themselves to blame. Once they released
that first digital copy, the next step was foreordained.
Every email comes with an implicit “Bcc:everyone” header
set; every Webpage is immortal. It’s easy to find stories of
people whose ribald emails got away from them, whose
“secret” blogs were discovered by their co-workers.19 It’s
all their fault, in this brave new CLICK-FORWARD electronic world. If you’re going to write something, anything
at all, you’d better be prepared to share.
I suppose it’s logically possible to think that a world
in which that iron maxim held true would be a good
one. You would have to do what David Brin does in The
Transparent Society and take it several giant steps further.
Given the complete dissolution of the category of the
“private,” you’d say, we must adjust our expectations so
as not to place such high value on privacy. As long as
everyone’s emails to their friends are similarly discoverable,
there will be no informational inequality and no injustice.
But when it comes to our fondness for speaking only into
our beloved’s ears, we will need to learn to let go of such
sentimentality and accept that MetaFilter is listening in.
Much that is now said in private will become public; the
rest will never be said at all.
In theory, one could go there. But Laurie Garrett
doesn’t want to live in that world, and it seems unlikely
that most of the MeFi-ites quoted above would like to live
there either. But if we want to avoid it, we must either
find a mechanism to prevent the free flow of information
or find a reason to believe that not all information will
naturally flow of its own accord.
SOCIAL NORMS
Not every email you send your lover will wind up on
MetaFilter; disgruntled (ex-)lovers have been going public with “personal” correspondence for centuries. Email
and the Internet are neither necessary nor sufficient for
the sort of expectations meltdown involved in the Laurie
Garrett incident. Your lover doesn’t forward your email,
well, out of love, and even afterwards, there’s still a taboo
on violating the confidences of that relationship. The
strongest pressure on Garrett’s friends not to forward that
email was social. She trusted them with a private email;
someone among them violated that trust. There’s your
5

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

problem, says dmt. Either you didn’t warn your friends
about your expectations or you have an untrustworthy
fink for a friend.
There’s something to this idea. We don’t ask our
friends to submit P3P policies to us before we send them
email.20 No, instead we wrap everything we say or write
in an implicit privacy policy, one grounded in the social
norms of our friendship and our society’s notions of friendship. These privacy policies can be remarkably intricate.
For example, teenage girls tell each other secrets that
are anything but. Similarly, when was the last time you
appended “please don’t forward to my boss” to an email
to your drinking buddies? Social norms aren’t going to go
away anytime soon; we can count on them to take care of
a lot of the subtle negotiations surrounding the exchange
of “private” information.
But social norms have never solved all our problems—think of the jilted lover choosing whether to burn
the love letters or publish them—and, more importantly,
the Internet does change things. Garrett’s example of the
letter that she handwrote from the Vienna Summit is
telling:
Now, imagine my recipient found the letter amusing
or insightful and photocopied my handwritten note,
posting it to ten friends. And so on. Snail mail hell?
Doubtful. In those seemingly ancient days we all
respected privacy, and the time and money required
to photocopy and post missives prompted all of us
to pause and question whether we had a right to
forward a personal letter without the authors permission.21
Her analysis of the reasons for that hesitation is wide
of the mark, but her conclusion is so obviously right we
often overlook it. Email and snail mail obey fundamentally different laws of propagation. Email can spread like
wildfire, but unless you get a copy of your snail-mail letter
into a major newspaper or can afford a massive direct-mail
spam, it stops with your friends.
In crudely mechanistic terms, going from paper to bits
lowers the cost of copying and forwarding. It takes a pretty
important letter to be worth the bother of Xeroxing,
stamping, and mailing, but even an infinitesimally small
benefit is worth the minimal cost of clicking on the forward button and typing in a few addresses. People who
wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email,
and they’ll forward it to more people. More people, each
of whom is more likely to forward the message, means a
greater likelihood that any given email will escape from
captivity. Or, put another way, email has a much lower
critical mass of interest than pen-and-paper mail has.
6
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Garrett attributes email’s wider circulation to the
passing of “those seemingly ancient days we all respected privacy,” that is, to the collapse of a social norm.
Technological determinists would emphasize instead a
mechanical cost-benefit tradeoff in which social norms
enter only as an afterthought. Both views are wrong
because the social norms that have grown up around
email are norms that usually make sense in the context
of rapid and easily replicable textual communication. On
the one hand, we don’t put quite as much of ourselves
into any given email as we would put into a letter; on the
other, we expect a certain degree of wider redistribution.
The median email is less private and more public in its
content than the median letter, not because our words
care whether they travel by ink or by bits, but because we
have evolved a set of expectations about email that are
less private and more public than our expectations about
traditional letters.
Even the most useful understandings break down
now and again, and Garrett got caught by just such a
breakdown. Her letter, although to her a “personal”
note, is fairly evidently the product of a journalist.
Thus, when the issue du jour was whether the letter was
a hoax, many commentators started from the assumption that it was a relatively informal dispatch, rather
than a relatively formal letter. It’s certainly not a bad
assumption—lots of interesting modern journalism is
highly informal22—and yet in this case it turned out to
be completely wrong.
What happened was that as the letter got forwarded
further and further from Garrett’s keyboard, the necessary
cues that would have indicated a disapproval of forwarding
were stripped away. By the time it hit the Psychohistory
mailing list, remember, the original header information, along with her last name, had gone missing. Under
those circumstances, who among us would not forward an
interesting essay? (Purported attributions aren’t always
reliable, either; just think of the “Kurt Vonnegut” commencement speech.23) More importantly, when the email
reached people who didn’t know Laurie Garrett personally, it reached people who didn’t know her expectations
about forwarding email. When it comes to the norms of
forwarding, these implicit headers are just as important as
the official ones.
How did the letter wind up in its denuded state? Once
again, one hardly needs to posit active malice. One of
Garrett’s friends forwards it to his wife; the wife sends it to
her two sisters, one of whom sends it to a co-worker who
strips the headers and sends it to three or four friends . . .
and bingo. We’ve reached escape velocity. The funny
thing is that even a Laurie Garrett might well have added
any given link to that chain. Given the close relationships
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involved, none of these individual decisions to forward
feels like a significant betrayal of trust.
Such are the social norms of email. Against these
norms, the idea that Garrett could or should have reined
in her friends starts to look more than a little cockeyed.
dmt wrote, “The mail we discussed didn’t have ‘please
don’t forward on’ written on it anywhere as far as I can
see,” but what would you do if Garrett’s email, disclaimer
attached, landed in your inbox? The social norms of email
look upon such disclaimers with thinly veiled contempt.
People who send email from disclaimer-laden corporate
accounts are roundly mocked; unless the email is obviously and by its very nature not meant for certain eyes (an
invitation to a surprise party would be one example), disclaimers are next to useless. This one forward is fine, goes
the thinking, and it is, but one plus one plus one equals
many, in the exponential logic of digital communications
media.
Even when social norms are mostly effective, it
doesn’t take much to go critical. As long as the average
number of forwards per recipient is greater than one—no
matter by how little—the laws of probability tell us to
expect nice happy exponential curves zipping up towards
infinity. The Internet treats indifference as damage and
routes around it. After all, if the Internet is all about
empowerment, then we want the few who care about an
issue to be active in getting the good word out. If you
believe in affinity groups and virtual social networks and
the creation of new communities online, then it’s a good
thing that the complaisant many can be outvoted by the
interested few. Otherwise, every last one of us would be
watching “American Idol,” instead of just a sixth of us.
Social norms won’t magically save us. At the most,
they tell us that Laurie Garrett misread the applicable
social norms of email, as they applied to her friends, to her
friends’ friends, to their friends, and so on. But that leaves
us back where we were at the end of the last section: She
won’t make that mistake again, which means that she’s
never writing one of these dispatches and committing it to
email again, which means no interesting discussion topic
for MetaFilter.
Perhaps one day we might bring her out of this selfimposed shell. Perhaps our understanding of email will
change. Perhaps we’ll have headers that “suggest” limited
distribution. X-Do-Not-Forward-Unless-You-Know-TheAuthor, X-Do-Not-Remove-Authors-Name, and X-DoNot-Forward-This-Means-You-Yes-You come to mind. Or
perhaps we’ll have a mind-your-own-business norm and
will delete anything not personally written expressly for
us. These prospects are unlikely, at best. Some of them
require us to turn our backs on the nature of email, to
forgo the very possibilities it opens up. Others feel like
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crude attempts to turn legal or technical rules into standards of conduct. None of them seem workable, especially
since these norms will require near-universal adherence if
privacy is the name of the game.
To repeat, there is something here. Well-understood
norms do—and will—prevent many privacy accidents.
But they have never been a complete solution, and the
advent of the Internet has rendered them strikingly less
effective. More people, more anonymity, fewer non-verbal
cues, greater individual autonomy, and the list goes on and
on. Today, more so than at any time in history, we can
interact with people whose values are not our own, and
we can do so under highly fluid and ambiguous conditions.
Quasi-private emails leak out all the time now, not because
we want what is private to become public, but because it
has become so hard to tell private from public in the context of email. Social norms will not rebottle this genie.
TECHNICAL RESPONSES
This leaves us with one remaining response: that
perhaps the Laurie Garretts of the world could prevent
their private emails from becoming public. Technological
self-help is an appealing idea; it seems to square with our
ideas about autonomy and the decentralized nature of
the Internet. As dmt asked, “Using encryption are we Ms
Garrett?”24
Well, no. She wasn’t. No one uses encryption,
not least because encryption wouldn’t have solved the
problem (as dmt went on to admit). True, it would have
stopped eavesdropping third parties from reading Garrett’s
email, but the point of good message encryption isn’t just
that unintended recipients can’t read your messages, but
also that intended recipients can. The recipients would
have had to have access to the text of her email, or there’d
be no point in sending it at all. But as soon as they had
access to the text of her email, the jig was up for technical
self-help.
It’s technically impossible to give someone a piece of
information without also empowering them to redistribute
that information. If you could, it wouldn’t be information. Encryption is fine for the digital connection, but
the digital connection was already the secure part of the
link. Garrett’s expectations of privacy were compromised
between the seat and the keyboard; the same place every
other foolproof scheme fails.
P3P—the much-hyped but little-used standard for
Web sites and browsers to negotiate over privacy policies—has been an abject flop for the same reasons.
Technology will encrypt your credit card number and send
your passport data only to sites that promise full privacy,
but technology will never be able to stop the unscrupulous
7
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merchant at the other end of the wire from doing whatever he wants. The only technologically meaningful bright
line is the one between the author and the entire rest of
the world; the first disclosure contains the prospect of all
the others. No privacy policy in this or any other world is
or can be self-enforcing.
True, strong privacy-protection technology might make
it annoying or difficult to CLICK-FORWARD that email. It
might require a more conscious effort to violate the author’s
expectations of non-disclosure. This would be a case in
which the privacy technology was useful for its effect on
social norms; I think this is the idea that Garrett had in
mind when she talked about the loss of “respect” for privacy
that she sees as part and parcel of the exchange of email. As
with disclaimers, it’s not unreasonable to think that a more
nuanced set of default forward permissions—your choice of
no forwards, one forward, forwards by author’s automated
approval, or unlimited forwards, say—might take care of
many of these accidental privacy leaks.
That said, any such scheme will face severe limits. No
set of rules or permissions will ever be sufficiently granular
to handle the infinite variety of human social relations.
After all, didn’t Garrett want her email to go only to
“people who will say nice things about it and/or quote it in
a positive context?”25 Go ahead, you try expressing “positive context” in a way enforceable by a computer.
Moreover, however effective such technical restrictions are at honoring the author’s wishes, they will be
exactly that effective in overriding the wishes of her correspondents and would-be forwarders. Technical schemes
make this conflict explicit: “I want to forward this email
but I can’t because the author says I can’t? Where’s
my autonomy in this, eh? What about my free speech
rights?” These conflicts are insoluble; reifying the rules in
technology makes them explicit; and where will explicit
adversarial relationships be most destructive? In contexts
characterized by informal interactions based on personal
trust, of course. Keeping private emails private is just about
the least likely place for a technical solution to work.
Even more damningly, a fundamental precondition
of technological solutions is the ability to force the other
guy or gal to play by your technological rules. Setting the
do-not-forward bit on your email is useless unless email
clients respect that bit. Therefore: Palladium.26 Therefore:
the broadcast flag.27 Therefore: certificate authorities.28
Therefore: the DVD Content Control Association.29 All
of these institutions are or were devoted to the widespread
enforcement of compliance. They encourage (or sometimes coerce) the adoption of their preferred technologies
in many different ways, but the underlying idea is always
the same: create a forum within which certain rules of
behavior are enforced at the architectural level.
8
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Enforcing Laurie Garrett’s wishes about the distribution of her thoughts on Davos, then, would have required
the deployment of some serious technical infrastructure.
The kicker is that this technical infrastructure needs to
be backed up by an equally serious institutional infrastructure. The broadcast flag won’t just find its way into
HDTV sets; someone powerful needs to put it there, possibly under threat of legal compulsion.30 There aren’t so
many open mail relays any more because the people who
run them get blackballed by the spam-hating vigilantes
of the Net. Cracking open your TiVo will void your warranty. Trusted systems are trusted for the same reason that
money is trusted: because of the strength of the institutions behind them.
If there is one thing that these huge and powerful
institutions are supremely ill-adapted to do, it would
have to be preserving the ambiguous privacy of quasi-personal emails. Privacy itself is an institutional non-starter.
TRUSTe has suffered from massive enforcement problems; P3P doesn’t even have an enforcement policy. It’s
hard to define offenses against information privacy, harder
to detect them, and harder still to translate issues of “privacy” into universally applicable standards. Indeed, the
very act of formulating a privacy policy at the technical
level has the unfortunate side effect of standardizing a data
format for the information supposedly to be kept private,
making it that much easier to merge and mine personal
information from multiple sources.
And that’s not the half of it. However hard technical protections on personal information may be, it’s at
least possible to formulate the question in a meaningful
way. Medical records, for example, are fairly well-defined
things, with a reasonably clear trust model: Medical professionals involved in the treatment of a patient have
access. But email? Email is squishy and contextual. The
“personal” part of a 2,000-word email may consist of
two sentences. Two emails may be completely innocent
taken individually but damning if they meet. The set of
“approved” readers may be hideously ill-defined; when
we fire off an email, most of us never give any thought to
deciding whether we’d be upset if Conan O’Brien read it.
It’s okay to forward this message, but not if it makes its
way back to Jim or Flora before next Thursday, unless they
already know.
The list goes on and on. Institutions may be able
to step in and sort through the smoking wreckage after
an email privacy disaster, but they will never be able to
promulgate a comprehensive set of policies in advance
of such disasters. Such a set of policies is precisely what
would be required for a technical solution to the CLICKFORWARD problem of private emails turning public.
Otherwise, we’ll be left with the situation that we face
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here: a great many almost-entirely innocent people glad
that they forwarded a letter and one almost-entirely
innocent person very upset that her letter was so widely
forwarded.
Faced with this choice, it’s not hard to see which way
people will jump. I doubt that even Laurie Garrett would
give up her ability to forward at will in exchange for a
complex and confusing anti-forwarding email client that
will perhaps keep her musings on Davos from becoming
public.
We’re back at one of the great truisms of computer
security: People make secure systems insecure. Not out of
malice, or even out of laziness. People make secure systems
insecure because insecure systems do what people want
and secure systems don’t. In this case, an insecure email
system that does what “people” want does something
Garrett doesn’t want.
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the world offer rapid-fire commentary and snide remarks
in response to a steady procession of links. Both seem an
awful lot like communities involved in worthwhile civic
engagement. But when you look at how they address each
other, it’s obvious that neither regards the other as a serious participant in the democratic exercise.
Thus, Garrett writes:
Do you imagine for a moment that the participants
in the WEF—whether they be the CEOs of Amoco
an IBM of the leaders of Amnesty International and
OXFAM—waste their time with Internet chat rooms
and discussions such as this? Do you actually believe,
as you type your random thoughts in such Internet
settings, that you are participating in Civilization? In
Democracy? In changing your world?
Whereas rcade replies:

D E M O C R AT I C VA L U E S
There’s something more at stake here than just email
forwards and hurt feelings. Laurie Garrett didn’t just write
some random email about her cats and her day at work.
She wrote a long and reasonably detailed inside account
of one of the most Zeitgeisty events on the planet. You
may or may not think that the World Economic Forum
invitees are quite as important as they think they are, but
they’re hardly insignificant players on the world stage. You
may or may not think that Garrett’s account was useful
and thoughtful, but you have to admit that it’s sparked
some decent discussion. To quote jessamyn again:
To be honest, I would worry about a democracy that
did not encourage the dissemination of information
using the Internet as a medium.
Now this is a real problem. Laurie Garrett’s composing a 2,000-word email to her friends is the sort of thing
democracies like to encourage. It represents journalism,
analysis, deliberative discourse, and the like. MetaFilter’s
discussion, as fueled by the Internet distribution of her
writing, is also the sort of thing democracies like to
encourage. It embodies citizen involvement, intermediate institutions, deliberative discourse, and the like. But
her democracy and their democracy seem to have some
trouble playing nicely with each other.
It’s possible to read this whole brouhaha as a culture
clash. On the one hand, you have Laurie Garrett and
her circle of close friends, who apparently exchange long
and factual letters by email and discuss the prevailing
mood among world leaders. On the other hand, you have
MetaFilter, in which bloggers and netizens from around

The world doesn’t need to wait around for professional journalists to carefully predigest the news
for us any more. We’re capable of collecting and
analyzing information from a thousand different
sources and directions, even an injudicious e-mail
by a chatty Pulitzer Prize winner to at least one
loose-lipped friend.31
The naturally sensible, empathetic reply to these
feuding flamers and their dueling versions of democratic
discussion is, “Do we have to choose?” Unfortunately, this
a question whose answer increasingly may be “yes.” What
happened here was that Garrett’s group, with its version
of discourse and its rules about forwarding, ran up against
the MetaFilter gang, with its own very different notions
of discourse and very different ethic of forwarding. Who
brought them together? The Internet, better known as the
very same communications tool both of them were using
to engage in their local forms of democratic activity.
Remember how everyone keeps saying that distance
is irrelevant on the Internet? This is what happens
when distance disappears. You wind up right next to the
damnedest people. You can hear your noisy neighbors;
they can’t help but overhear you. These communities are
having some serious boundary issues. When you speak
in one, it’s no longer so clear which community you’re
addressing. Theorists of democracy are all over the map
on the nature of interest groups and whether intra-group
conversations are good or bad. But Laurie Garrett’s experience is especially striking, because it suggests both that the
Internet encourages the formation of virtual communities
with divergent norms and interests and that it brings these
groups into contact—and conflict.
9
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Remember how everyone keeps saying that the
Internet blurs the line between private and public? Well,
here you go. Case study. A letter meant to be “private” is
interpreted as “public”; it then becomes public because
people think of it as such. When the author complains,
her status as a journalist becomes a reason for claiming
that she should expect her “personal” writings to be held
to the same standards as her “public” ones (quote from
dmt):
Your humiliation is right and deserved. Stand by
what you’ve written or don’t write it—as writer
you should know better than to commit falsehoods
(i.e. factual inaccuracies) to paper, regardless of
their recipient.32
At the same time, note that Garrett’s original email
was a “private” letter about the World Economic Forum, a
“private” organization of “public” figures. Her attendance
was part of the WEF’s carefully calculated media strategy.
Her email spread so widely, in part, because it reflected
information that the WEF was willing, presumably eager,
to have distributed. Her email was able to cross into the
Web bloodstream precisely because it was never wholly
“private” or “public” to begin with. Put another way, social
norms fell down on the job here because it was highly
ambiguous which set of norms ought to govern.
It’s a commonplace belief that the Internet gives
every author an unlimited audience. Perhaps not every
author wants an unlimited audience. There are some
things that Laurie Garrett would rather not write than let
the Internet read. Actually, that’s not strictly true. Laurie
Garrett may still write letters of this sort, but she won’t
commit them to email. As we’ve already noted, when
Garrett refuses to use email for a letter perfectly suited to
email, something has been lost.
A C L I C K - F O RWA R D WO R L D
But that’s not strictly true, either. The situation is
even worse than Garrett realizes, or will be soon. She
would like to go back to 1979 longhand, but she can’t. She
can only go back to 2003 longhand, which is a very different animal. Anyone with enough time could transcribe
her letter and fire off hundreds of copies by email. Or they
could just shove it in a fax machine. Or they could scan
it and post the images on the Web. Or they could wait a
few years and run some impending generation of OCR
software on the letter. Same result.
As these digitizations become easier, the same CLICKFORWARD social regime that governs email will make
ever-greater inroads into the paper world. How long until
10
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we see a tablet PC with a built-in full-page scanner? Five
years? Less? Who then will object to scanning a letter?
SCAN-FORWARD is coming; when it arrives, where
then will the Laurie Garretts of the world turn? The problem isn’t just that the Internet is leaky; the Internet makes
everything leaky.
In the face of this prediction, Garrett’s choice becomes
much starker. She can write for the world or not at all.
There is no middle ground. Perhaps she will write for
the world—spell-check every how-are-you and organize
her holiday greetings as inverted pyramids. Perhaps she’ll
write as she’s always written, knowing full well that the
world will make fun of her grammar. Or perhaps she’ll
decide that the game isn’t worth the candle and keep her
thoughts to herself. I can see her, or people in her shoes,
trying all of these options. Any which way, someone
loses.
When Laurie Garrett modifies her style to be
MetaFilter-friendly, her intended readers lose, because
these unwanted interlopers have come between her and
the words that she would have chosen for her true audience. When she shrugs and lets her personal thoughts
leak to the world, she loses because the connection and
trust involved in private communications have been burnt
away. In both of these cases, the sphere of the “private”
has suffered from its Internet-induced collision with the
“public.”
But when Laurie Garrett stops writing entirely, we
all lose, because it is the “public” realm that has suffered
from the collision. Something interesting and useful has
gone unsaid. Not something useful to us individually.
Something useful to us as a society, grist for the democratic mill. In jessamyn’s words:
Maintaining a free society requires an informed
populace.33
It’s easy to claim that the “problem” is an author who
doesn’t believe in democracy or a community that doesn’t
value privacy. But neither of these claims is quite the case
here. There’s something deeper and more troubling at
work. The populace, by the very act of informing itself,
has cut off a source of its information.
I don’t know about you, but I’m worried.
POSTSCRIPT: ELEPHANTS
AND LIONS
It’s time to come clean. There’s an elephant in this
room. I’ve been avoiding mentioning it because once you
point out the elephant in the corner, nobody can talk
about anything else. I want this discussion to end with the
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elephant, not begin with it. But since we’re coming to the
end, the time has come to deal with the elephant that is
copyright.
Laurie Garrett, after all, has a copyright in her written works. One can argue about the terms on which she
licensed her email—she did, after all, send it, without
disclaimer, to an undisclosed list of friends—but the
baseline assumption would still be that she retains copyright to her words. Every subsequent forward was a prima
facie infringement on her copyright. And by the familiar
copyright legal logic of the last few years, she should—in
theory—be able to cease-and-desist her way into having
that letter redacted from every Web site, deleted from
every errant inbox.
To state this possibility is to refute it. From Garrett’s
perspective, the damage is already done. None of the
unkind comments will be retracted, no one who has read
the letter will unread it. Cease-and-desist letters are a
great way to lose old friends and make new enemies. An
email is so small, so easy to encode and disguise, so close
to a pure meme, that she doesn’t stand a chance even of
identifying all the copies out there, let alone of enjoining
them out of existence. Copyright law is not about to solve
Laurie Garrett’s problems. It’s just the wrong tool for the
job.
But that’s not to say that copyright isn’t relevant. This
whole microdrama has played itself out in the elephant’s
shadow. Laurie Garrett wants to restrict distribution of
her words to certain people—close friends—and what’s
so wrong with that? But you might equally well say that
novelists want to restrict distribution of their words to
certain people—paying customers—and what’s so wrong
with that? Any solution you cook up to help Garrett out
of her jam is going to help some other people out of a jam,
too. The Recording Industry Association of America, for
instance. Garrett is in the position of the music labels; the
Psychohistory discussion list was her Napster.
Many MeFites were aware of this similarity. The
hostility some expressed towards Garrett resembles nothing quite so much as anti-RIAA rants. Even those who
were more personally sympathetic towards her share in
the ideological commitment to free distribution of information. Hard cases make bad law, goes the saying; one
author’s hardship, says MetaFilter, is no reason to abandon
a principled stance. Information wants to be free, will be
free, and this is good.
I’m not so sure. For all her lack of tact, Laurie
Garrett is a much more sympathetic poster child than the
Universal Music Group. She’s in the self-censorship game
to preserve her sense of privacy, not for the money. If we
say “no” to her, we’re saying “no” to the lovers and the
dreamers.
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On a technical level, privacy and copyright are
isomorphic problems. Information is to be shared with
certain people and not with others. From this observation
have come some interesting ideas. (For example, Jonathan
Zittrain suggests using digital rights management to keep
electronic medical records private.34) But this overlap has
unfortunate consequences, as well, because many people’s
ethical intuitions cut very differently across these two
problems. A technically consistent pair of responses to
them may feel wildly inconsistent as a matter of right and
wrong. If credit-card databases were trivially available on
major BitTorrent trackers, how many people who now
believe in file-sharing would demand a complete ban on
BitTorrent?
The conventional distinction between privacy and
copyright is that the information is used in different ways.
Copyright violations tend to involve many individuals
violating the rights of a few large entities; privacy violations often reverse this picture. This asymmetry makes it
possible to enforce privacy protections. You could stop the
NSA in its tracks by prohibiting them from maintaining
the wrong sort of database. You could go out, find major
commercial violators, and slap them with big fines. The
traditional privacy violator invades privacy wholeseale;
“copyright infringement” today often connotes something
much more individualistic.
Internet-enabled, peer-to-peer privacy violators break
down this convenient distinction. There is only one
Laurie Garrett, but a great many people have seen a letter she never meant them to see. There was no central
chokepoint, no privacy-intrusion clearinghouse. Our legal
system can handle (or could, if it tried harder) the big boys
who want to be big brothers, too; it’s not so well equipped
to stop people from hitting the “forward” button. Indeed,
for all the reasons above, privacy spills like Garrett’s are
much harder to conceptualize, contain, and prevent than
copyright leaks. Ten years down the road, we could have
a system in which music traders go to jail but personal
emails are never safe from public eyes.
But enough with the doom and gloom. For now, at
least, most private emails stay private; most expectations
are honored. Laurie Garrett’s plight is striking because it is
not yet the norm. We trust email, not because it promises us
anything in trade for our trust, but because it hasn’t burned
us. Too badly. Yet. As long as the spills and leaks are rare,
we are likely to cross our fingers and hope for the best.
Stupid? Perhaps not. Think of form contracts: the
interminable pages of small print you pretend to read, the
shrinkwrap software licenses you click through without
hesitation, the bank documents you sign in the belief that
the dreaded soul-forfeiture clause will never be turned
against you. As Karl Llewellyn wrote:
11
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[T]he form-agreements tend either at once or over
the years, and often by whole lines of trade, into
a massive and terrifying jug-handled character;
the one party lays his head into the mouth of a
lion—either, and mostly, without reading the fine
print, or occasionally in hope and expectation
(not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and
gentle lion.35
The privacy lion is drawing blood.
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